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Abstract 
China’s engagement in the so-called international fragmentation of production – namely ‘cross-border 
dispersion of component production/assembly within vertically integrated manufacturing industries’ – has 
become an increasingly important form of its economic integration into the regional as well as the global 
economy. The paper presents the recent trend of trade in parts and components between China and its 
main trading partners. Applying an adjusted gravity modelling method, the paper explores how China’s 
pattern of trade in parts and components is being determined. The paper found that China’s rapid 
economic growth, increasing market size and economies of scale, foreign direct investment and 
infrastructure development including transportation and telecommunications are important factors in 
explaining China’s rapid increase of bilateral trade in parts and components with its trading partners. The 
paper also found that the spatial distance and transportation costs have significant negative impacts on 
China’s trade of parts and components suggesting that the reduction in transportation costs by 
technological innovation and investment could enhance trade in parts and components, and thereby 
deepen the process of international specialization involving China and its main trading partners. The 
paper argues that given the prospects of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy, its current and planned 
massive investments in R&D and in infrastructure, its continual policies in attracting FDI and its rapid 
move towards liberalizing its services sectors including its financial sectors, the scope for China and its 
trading partners to benefit from the process of international fragmentation of production is tremendous. 
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1 Introduction 
A symbol of China’s economic integration into the global economy is its progressive 
engagement in international commodity trade, with an increasing scale and intensity. 
From 1992 to 2005, the average growth rate of China’s total trade was 18.5 per cent per 
annum – twice as high as the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in the same 
period. China’s total trade reached US$1.76 trillion in 2006, with a trade dependency 
ratio (defined as the ratio of total trade over its GDP) rising to about 68 per cent by the 
national account measures (UNCTAD 2006). Among this increasing trade, China’s 
engagement in the so-called international fragmentation of production – namely, ‘cross-
border dispersion of component production/assembly within vertically integrated 
manufacturing industries’ (Feenstra 1998; Jones and Kierzkowski 2005) – has become 
an increasingly important form of its economic integration into the regional as well as 
the global economy.  
The development of component trade is significant for the following reasons (Jones 
et al. 2005). First, it has exhibited a dynamism exceeding that of trade in final goods, as 
breaking down the integrated process into separate stages of production opens up new 
possibilities for exploiting gains from specialization (Jones and Kierzkowski 2001). 
Second, despite it being a type of trade increasingly paramount in advanced stages of 
globalization, it opens up an important role for developing economies (unlike intra-
industry trade, which has been conducted mainly among industrialized countries). 
Third, it is more closely related to the development and liberalization of the services 
sector than final good trade is particularly with respect to transportation, 
communication, banking and insurance, and other connecting service links. This is 
because increasing returns to scales tend to be associated with the development of these 
service sectors, which could in turn reduce the costs associated with the fragmentation 
process. 
The global total trade in parts and components increased from US$400 billion in 1992 
to US$1.25 trillion in 2005. The share of component trade in the total trade of 
manufacturing goods increased from 21 per cent to 26 per cent. Such a trend is 
especially pronounced in the East Asian region, which has accounted for more than half 
of the trade in parts and components. East Asia is progressively replacing the United 
States and the European Union as the world’s largest region for trade in parts and 
components, forming a large integrated network for production (Athukorala 2006). 
China has been playing an increasingly important role in this development. 
This paper presents the recent trend of trade in parts and components between China 
and its main trading partners. It explores how China’s pattern of trade in parts and 
components is being determined in terms of the shares of this trade in its total exports 
and imports, and their respective shares in total manufacturing trade. The analytical 
approach adopted is an adjusted gravity modelling method incorporating relative labour 
costs, foreign direct investment (FDI) and telecommunications in estimating the 
regression models. Policy implications with respect to the role of technology, labour 
productivity, further development and liberalization of the services sectors are then 
discussed.   2
2  China’s increasing trade in parts and components 
The rise of China’s trade has been an important part of the changing pattern of 
international production segmentation in East Asia. On the import side, the share of 
parts and components had already accounted for more than one-third of the total imports 
in China in 2002. Among the intermediate goods trade, imports of parts and components 
increased more significantly than any other intermediate goods and the share of parts 
and components in total imports increased from 19 per cent in 1997 to 27 per cent in 
2002. On the exportation side, final goods played a dominant part in total exports – 
accounting for more than 60 per cent of the total in 2002. Meanwhile, China’s 
intermediate goods trade has been concentrated mainly in Asia: more than 80 per cent 
comes from Asia and more than 60 per cent of exports of parts and components goes to 
other Asian economies (Gaulier et al. 2005). In general, importing intermediate goods, 
then processing and exporting the final goods characterizes China’s trading relations 
with its main trading partners.  
To analyse China’s trade in parts and components with its main trading partners, we 
select 219 kinds of parts and components taken from the United Nations’ Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC Version 3) numbers SITC-7 and SITC-8, 
consisting of 2,800 commodities, following Yeats (2001) and Athukorala (2006).1 
Altogether, there are 25 trading partners: the United States, Canada, Mexico, the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Brunei, 
Laos, India, Brazil, Pakistan and South Africa.2 
Since the early 1990s, trade in parts and components between China and its trading 
partners has been increasing rapidly. In 1992, China’s imports and exports of parts and 
components were worth US$12.1 billion and US$4.3 billion respectively (Figures 1 and 
2). By 2005, China’s imports and exports of parts and components increased to US$176 
billion and US$110 billion – 15 times and 26 times those in 1992 respectively (Figure 
1). Growth of imports of parts and components is continuing to outpace that of exports. 
At the same time, the share of imports of parts and components in total manufacturing 
imports increased dramatically from 16 per cent in 1992 to 35 per cent in 2005 
(Figure 2). The fact that component trade accounted for more than one-third of total 
manufacturing imports illustrates China’s increasing role in international fragmentation 
of production.  
To further analyse the increasing trend of trade in parts and components, one needs to 
look at the distribution of component trade by sector as well as by destination. The 
former tells how component trade concentrates on certain sectors and the latter shows 
with whom China has engaged in developing component trade. 
                                                 
1  SITC Version 3 was adopted in 1992 so the data series used in this paper began in that year. 
2  In selecting partnering countries, consideration includes country representation and availability of 
data.   3
3  The pattern of component trade by sectors 
In 1992, China’s exports of parts and components for machinery and transportation 
(SITC-7) were worth US$3.4 billion, which accounted for 80 per cent of the total 
exports of parts and components and 5.1 per cent of manufacturing exports (Table 1). In 
the same year, its exports of parts and components for other manufacturing goods were 
worth US$800 million, accounting for 19 per cent of total exports of parts and 
components and 1.2 per cent of manufacturing exports. Exports of parts and 
components accounted for 6.3 per cent of total manufacturing exports.  
In 2004, China’s exports of parts and components for machinery and transportation 
were worth US$87.5 billion, accounting for 94 per cent of the total exports of parts and 
components and 15.9 per cent of total manufacturing exports. Its exports of parts and 
components for other manufacturing goods were worth US$5.5 billion, accounting for 
5.8 per cent of the total exports of parts and components and 1 per cent of 
manufacturing exports. Total exports of parts and components accounted for 16.9 per 
cent of total manufacturing exports. The annual growth rate of exports of parts and 
components for machinery and transport in this period was 31 per cent, while that of 
other manufacturing was 17.1 per cent. The annual growth rate of total exports of parts 
and components was 29.3 per cent.  
China’s imports of parts and components for machinery and transportation were worth 
US$10 billion in 1992, accounting for 87 per cent of total imports of parts and 
components and 15.8 per cent of total manufacturing imports (Table 1). China’s imports 
of parts and components for other manufacturing goods were worth US$1.6 billion, 
accounting for 13 per cent of total imports of parts and components and 2.4 per cent of 
total manufacturing imports in the same year. Total imports of parts and components 
accounted for 18.2 per cent of total imports of manufactured products.  
In 2004, China’s imports of parts and components for machinery and transportation 
increased to US$148 billion, accounting for 97 per cent of total imports of parts and 
components and 33.4 per cent of total manufacturing imports. China’s imports of other 
parts and components climbed to US$4.1 billion, accounting for 2.7 per cent of total 
imports of parts and components and 1 per cent of total manufacturing imports. 
Total imports of parts and components accounted for 34.3 per cent of manufacturing 
product imports. The annual growth rate of imports of machinery and transportation 
products was, on average, 24.7 per cent and that of imports in other parts and 
components was 8.2 per cent in this period. The annual growth rate of total imports in 
parts and components was 23.4 per cent, on average, in this period.  
Machinery and transportation products increased more quickly than other products in 
component trade. In particular, office machinery and equipment (SITC-75), 
telecommunications and recording equipment (SITC-76) and electrical machinery and 
parts (SITC-77) played dominant roles, accounting for nearly 80 per cent of the total 
component trade. As a result, the share of machinery and transportation in the total trade 
of parts and components is increasing while that of other manufacturing products is 
decreasing over time. This finding is consistent with the fact that the composition of 
China’s exports has been moving quickly towards those capital and technology-
intensive products in recent years.    4
China has been running component-trade deficits, caused mainly by rapid increases in 
its importation of parts and components for machinery and transportation products. This 
trade gap tends to increase further as China’s capacity for producing these products 
increases, so China will continue to rely heavily on imported parts and components. On 
the other hand, China has become a net exporter of parts and components relating to 
labour-intensive manufacturing products since 2000.  
The growth rates of China’s component trade have been higher than the growth rates of 
manufacturing sectors as well as the growth rates of total trade. This suggests that the 
pattern of the international division of labour in which China has participated has been 
deepened to cover finer international fragmentation of production. The further 
development of such patterns means that countries involved will gain from trade in parts 
and components rather than from trade in final goods. Such development will cement 
even closer trading relationships among countries involved in such a network of 
production. This point can be illustrated by looking at China’s trade in parts and 
components by partners. 
4  China’s trade in parts and components by partners 
Although the regional distribution of China’s imports of parts and components varies 
over time, the main sources of China’s imports of parts and components seem to 
concentrate in Northeast Asia, which accounted for more than 50 per cent of China’s 
total imports of components (Table 2). Japan’s share was increasing between 1992 and 
1997, but started to fall after 1998, due possibly to the impact of the East Asian 
financial crisis. Japan, however, together with Korea (whose share increased rapidly 
throughout the period), ranked the highest in terms of their shares of China’s imports of 
components. The shares of the United States and Canada reached their peak about 2000 
and started to decline thereafter. Hong Kong’s share decreased from 38.7 per cent to 
2.15 per cent, reflecting the fact that it was no longer a major supplier of parts and 
components to China. The shares from four EU countries (Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom and Italy) also decreased to low levels in 2005. Imports of parts and 
components from five Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries 
(Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand) increased rapidly from 
less than 1 per cent in 1992 to 18 per cent in 2005.  
The data show that China has been relying less and less on the major industrialized 
countries in Europe and North America to provide parts and components for its part in 
the international fragmentation of production. In contrast, the newly industrialized 
economies and ASEAN countries have become important sources of China’s imports of 
parts and components. There is also a strong tendency for Korea and large ASEAN 
countries to replace Japan and Hong Kong in providing China with parts and 
components. The rapid development of component trade between China and its 
neighbouring economies in East and Southeast Asia indicates that these regional 
economies have become increasingly integrated through the international fragmentation 
of production.  
Total exports of parts and components from China to industrialized countries have been 
increasing steadily, while those to East Asia – in particular, to Hong Kong and Japan – 
have been falling (Table 3). Despite this trend, East Asia’s average share of China’s 
exports to the world was about 55 per cent compared with 17 per cent for the North   5
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries and 7 per cent for the European 
Union in 2005. Exports to Korea have increased from 1.3 per cent to 5 per cent and 
those to six ASEAN countries (Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Vietnam) have also increased – from 4.1 per cent in 1992 to 12 per cent in 2005.  
Korea, Japan and the six ASEAN countries have become important sources of China’s 
imports of parts and components, accounting for more than 50 per cent of China’s total 
imports of these products (Table 3). As those of Japan and Hong Kong are decreasing, 
the shares of Korea and ASEAN countries have been increasing. This implies that there 
have been some substitution effects between Japan, Hong Kong and other Asian 
countries in providing parts and components to China. Despite this substitution effect, 
China’s continuing strong demand for parts and components from the region will be 
conducive to the economic growth of regional economies. 
About 55 per cent of China’s exports of parts and components have been to Northeast 
and Southeast Asia, with China’s major exporting markets being Hong Kong, Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. This trend is likely to be strengthened 
further. At the same time, China’s export shares to North America and Europe have 
been steadily increasing over time. Overall, China’s relatively high export and import 
shares of parts and components to East Asia supports the view that China has engaged 
more deeply with East Asian economies in forging this new type of international 
specialization in production. China’s export shares of parts and components to Australia 
have been generally higher than its import shares, but both shares have been relatively 
low compared with East Asian economies. 
5  Determinants of China’s component trade  
In explaining the phenomenon of component trade or international fragmentation of 
production, Jones (2007) postulates the following theories. The first is a Ricardian one, 
which says that workers have different skills across different areas of a country, and 
when the skills required in each production block (fragments) differ, then a dispersion 
of activity according to comparative advantage could lower marginal production costs. 
The second theory is a Heckscher-Ohlin type of difference, namely the production 
blocks differ from each other in the proportions of different factors that are required. 
This suggests that labour-intensive production blocks would better be located in regions 
in which labour is relatively inexpensive compared with productivity.  
The third theory is that fragmentation introduces new costs, namely the costs of 
connecting the two or more production blocks by service links such as transportation 
and communication. Therefore, ‘the movement towards deregulation, especially of 
services, and the technological changes that have drastically reduced the costs of 
communication as well as making transportation less expensive have all encouraged a 
fragmentation of previously vertically integrated production processes’ (Jones and 
Marjit 2001: 365). Furthermore, it is argued that the optimal degree of fragmentation 
depends on the size of the market, so economic growth in general encourages 
fragmentation and trade in parts and components (Jones et al. 2005). We examine in this 
section the main determinants of China’s trade in parts and components based on these 
theories.   6
The theory of comparative advantage has been consistent with China’s trading pattern: 
China produces and exports a large range of mainly labour-intensive goods, such as 
textiles and clothing, shoes, toys, travel goods and furniture. 
The question is whether the theory of comparative advantage can be applied also in 
analysing intra-product trade based on vertical specialization of production such as 
component trade. China tends to focus on producing parts and components relating to 
labour-intensive products due to its abundant supply of labour. For example, the 
production of personal computers requires a lot of components, including central 
processing units, mainboards, sound cards, display cards, screens and so on. Although 
China has no comparative advantage in producing some of the key components, it can 
assemble and export a large quantity of personal computers since it has low-cost 
production for the assembly of those components.  
One way to examine the relationship between comparative advantage and the 
production and trade of parts and components is to compare labour-cost differences 
across different countries. Wages are a good index as they reflect the supply and 
demand of the labour market as well as the quality of labour. When a country’s wage 
levels are relatively low, it could indicate that the country has comparative advantage in 
producing labour-intensive products, including parts and components. 
In the period 1992–2004, labour costs in China were far lower than those in most 
industrialized countries, including the United States, Japan, Canada, Germany and the 
United Kingdom (Table 4). They were also relatively lower than many developing 
economies in Asia such as Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. 
With respect to the impact of economy of scale on component trade, it is usually the 
case that rapid economic growth requires a large market to accommodate the products 
being produced. The process of trade liberalization in the past few decades – enhanced 
through multilateral, bilateral or unilateral means – provides China with an external 
environment in which rising trade from China has been accommodated rather smoothly. 
The enlarged markets for products made in China have created an enormous economy 
of scale in production. It is known that the degree of specialization of production tends 
to be intensified when there are economies of scale in production. As economy of scale 
is enlarged, the production and trade of parts and components within and across 
different countries tend to be enhanced.  
On the other hand, China has a large domestic market, implying that there is a relative 
thickness in the market in those competitive sectors (meaning that there are relatively 
more suppliers of intermediate goods for a given sector). This is especially true in those 
sectors such as textiles and clothing, shoes, computers and automobiles. As Grossman 
and Helpman (2003) note, this characteristic reduces the search costs for multinational 
companies investing in overseas markets. At the same time, continuing domestic 
reforms in China provided an improved legal and regulatory environment in which 
foreign investments have flourished, deepening the process of international 
specialization in production.  
China’s transportation and telecommunications industries have experienced rapid 
growth since the 1990s, providing the necessary infrastructure for China’s participation 
in international specialization. Figures 3 and 4 show the recent development of China’s 
transportation industry. The number of civil aviation airline routes increased from 287   7
in 1986 to 1,257 in 2005 – increasing by 3.4 times – and international airline routes also 
increased, from 108,000 km to 856,000 km. The capacity of seaports also increased – 
from 300 million tonnes in 1985 to 2.9 billion tonnes in 2005. 
China’s telecommunications industry has developed rapidly. The number of fixed lines 
per 1,000 people increased from less than 10, on average, in 1992 to 241 in 2004 
(Figure 5). Along with the development of the telecommunications industry, call fees 
are declining. For example, in 1997, the average cost of calling the United States was 
US$6.70, but this reduced to US$2.90 in 2004. Meanwhile, the number of mobile 
phones in China has reached 480 million by March 2007 – making it the largest mobile-
phone market in the world – and the number of people accessing the internet reached 
144 million by March 2007, making China the second largest internet-using country 
after the United States.3 These facts suggest that the rapid development of China’s 
transportation and telecommunication industries could be another factor influencing the 
pace and depth of China’s participation in international fragmentation of production. 
This is mainly because the developments in these service links tend to reduce the costs 
of transactions with considerable benefits from the economies of scale associated with 
such developments. 
FDI has been considered an important determinant of trade in parts and components in 
the literature because multinational corporations are an important channel for 
conducting trade in intermediate goods through intra-firm trade. Multinational firms can 
choose to invest in host countries and make use of the local comparative advantage to 
produce their intermediate goods. For example, Kaminski and Smarzynska (2001) 
studied the impact of FDI on Poland’s internationalization process and found that the 
large FDI inflow helped Poland access international specialization and increased the 
country’s trade. Cheng et al. (2001) studied the relationship between FDI and 
international specialization by using a partial equilibrium model to examine trade 
between Hong Kong and Guangdong Province, incorporating FDI. They found that FDI 
was an important factor for production specialization and trade in parts and components 
in China.  
China has absorbed a large amount of FDI since the 1990s and has now become the 
leading country in the world for the receipt of FDI inflows (Figure 6). The rapid 
increase of FDI inflows into China promotes the development of processing trades 
(Spencer 2005). The share of the FDI-related manufacturing sector in the total 
manufacturing sector has been increasing rapidly, and the share of total processing trade 
increased from 35 per cent in 1988 to 57 per cent in 2003, surpassing the share of 
ordinary trade. 
Based on the theories surveyed and the background information, we adopted an adjusted 
gravity model to examine the determinants of trade in parts and components between 
China and its trading partners. The basic formula is introduced by Egger and Egger 
(2005) as follows: 
                                                 
3 See ‘Internet in the People’s Republic of China’ on Wikipedia (available online at 
http://www.wikipedia.com).   8
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     (1) 
where  PC represents either the exportation or importation of parts and components 
between China and its trading partners, AGDP is the average real GDP of China and its 
trading partners, DIST is the economic distance between China and its trading partners, 
RWAGE is the relative labour cost of China and its trading partners, FDI is the foreign 
direct investment, and Teleline is the average number of fixed telephones in China and 
its trading partners.  
According to Jones and Kierzkowski (2005), these factors can affect the trade in parts 
and components as well as the final goods. Thus, Equation 1 can be revised as follows: 
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     (2) 
where  SPC is the share of exports of parts and components in the total trade in 
manufactured products. A fixed effect is introduced in both equations while conducting 
the panel data regressions.  
The variables used in the regressions are defined as follows: to capture the impact of 
economy of scale, we use the average GDP of China and its trading partners.  
. 2
j China
j China
GDP GDP
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+
=
     (3) 
For the distance variable, we use the weighted-average economic distance to represent 
the transportation costs in which DISTf is the physical distance between countries. 
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To reflect the impact of comparative advantage, we use the relative wage (RWAGE) to 
represent the unit costs of China and its trading partners. 
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     (5) 
In order to examine the impact of FDI on trade in parts and components, we simply use 
the share of FDI over that of GDP. To capture the impact of telecommunications, we   9
use the number of telephone lines per 1,000 people to represent the index for telephone 
lines. 
The data on trade in parts and components between China and its trading partners are 
taken from UNCTAD (2006), covering 219 products. The time period runs from 1992 
to 2004 and the sample comprises 20 countries, as introduced in the last section. GDP 
for each country is taken from the Penn World Table 6.2. The indexes we have chosen 
are ‘CGDP’ and ‘POP’ and their products are used as the GDP variable. The data of 
FDI are taken from the China Statistical Yearbooks for 1993–2005 (NBS various 
issues). The data for economic distance are taken from Haveman (2004). The data of 
telephone lines per 1,000 people are taken from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2006). The data of average labour unit costs per hour are taken from EIU 
Country Data (Economist Intelligence Unit 2007). 
The empirical results are reported in Tables 5 and 6, showing the determinants of 
China’s imports and exports of parts and components respectively. In each table, there 
are two groups of results: one contains no variable of LNTELELINE  and the other 
contains this variable. Both results show good fitness of our model specification, since 
the R-squares for the two model estimations are 0.7 and 0.8 respectively.  
The results show that the coefficients of LNAGDP in all regressions are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, implying that China’s size and economies 
of scale and its trading partners has a positive impact on China’s imports of parts and 
components. That is, the larger the economies of scale, the greater trade in parts and 
components will be. Furthermore, comparing this result with that from the regression 
using Equation 2, we found that the impact of economies of scale on trade in parts and 
components was larger than that of final goods. This is consistent with findings obtained 
in Jones and Kierzkowski (2005). 
The coefficients of LNDIST – as the measurement of the impact of transport and other 
costs on bilateral trade flows – are negative and statistically significant, as expected. 
Despite the fact that the rapid development of telecommunications techniques leads to 
the ‘death of distance’ (Cairncross 1997), the estimated coefficient of economic distance 
is still negative and statistically significant. This implies that trade in parts and 
components in China relative to its trading partners is still sensitive to the changes in 
transportation costs and the physical distance between them.  
As expected, FDI has a positive impact on China’s imports and exports of parts and 
components and it is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The regression 
results show that the impact of FDI on exports of parts and components is similar to that 
of imports and the magnitudes of the estimated coefficient are within the range of 0.2–
0.3. This finding implies that a 1 per cent increase in FDI could lead to a 0.2–0.3 per 
cent increase in China’s exports of parts and components. The purpose of FDI is 
twofold: one is to sell products to China’s domestic market and the other is to make use 
of China’s comparative advantage of low-cost labour. Both motives could lead to 
increased trade in parts and components.  
Tables 5 and 6 also show the results when LNTELELINE  is incorporated as the 
measurement to capture the impact of telecommunications on component trade. As is 
expected, the telecommunications service and its coverage have a significant positive 
impact on international specialization through trade in parts and components.   10
The results of LNRWAGE  show significant differences between the regressions of 
imports of parts and components, which is consistent with what the theory of 
comparative advantage would predict. For China’s imports of parts and components, 
The coefficients of foreign countries’ labour costs are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level (Table 5). The results imply that the relatively low cost 
of labour in China is one of the most important determinants of the rapid development 
of trade in parts and components between China and its trading partners – since China’s 
comparative advantage in labour costs attracts greater imports of parts and components 
for assembly.  
The estimated results show, however, that there is no significant difference for the 
variable of LNRWAGE  (Table 6) in determining China’s exports of parts and 
components. The insensitivity of wage differentials in determining China’s exports of 
parts and components remains a puzzle, which requires further study.  
Since all the factors included in the regressions would have similar effects on trade in 
final products, we can also run the regression with the share of trade in parts and 
components in total manufacturing trade as the dependent variable in both equations, 
the estimation results are reported in Table 7. Comparison with the previous results 
shows that economies of scale have a significantly positive impact on trade in parts and 
components, while transportation costs have a significantly negative impact. The 
findings are consistent with those reported in Tables 5 and 6. Furthermore, the impact of 
FDI on exports in parts and components is not statistically significant compared with 
the results in Table 6.  
The impact of labour costs is significantly negative in the export shares in total 
manufacturing exports, which is in contrast with the finding of positive correlation in 
China’s imports of parts and component (Table 5). This suggests that the theory of 
comparative labour cost applies more to China’s imports of parts and components than 
to its exports of them. Since China’s imports of parts and components concentrate more 
on capital and technology intensive goods such as machinery and transportation 
(Table 1), the finding of positive correlation of labour cost differentials may suggest that 
foreign firms investing in China are more sensitive to labour cost differences between 
China and elsewhere in those more sophisticated parts and components. It is 
understandable as labour costs in producing these kinds of intermediate goods in 
developed countries are much higher than that in China (Table 4), whereas the labour 
cost differentials between industrialized and developing economies in producing less 
sophisticated intermediate goods tend to be narrower. Since China’s exports of parts and 
components concentrate more on those less sophisticated labour intensive products, 
both foreign firms and domestic firms producing such intermediates goods tend to 
become less sensitive to labour cost differentials. Under this circumstance, market size, 
economies of scale and service links rather than FDI and labour cost differentials will 
play more important roles in determining the pattern of exports of parts and 
components. Finally, consistent with the findings reported in Tables 5 and 6, the 
development in telecommunications is also correlated positively with the shares of 
exports of parts and components in total manufacturing exports.   11
6 Conclusion 
The empirical results reveal the following points. First, China’s rapid economic growth, 
increasing market size and economies of scale are important factors in explaining the 
rapid increase of bilateral trade in parts and components with its trading partners. 
Second, the spatial distance and transportation costs have significant negative impacts 
on China’s trade of parts and components. This suggests that the reduction in 
transportation costs by technological innovation and investment could enhance trade in 
parts and components, and thereby deepen the process of international specialization 
involving China and its main trading partners. Third, FDI has a positive impact on 
China’s participation in international fragmentation of production, taking advantage of 
China’s comparative advantage in low labour costs in assembly of intermediate goods 
and producing final goods for domestic sales and exports. Finally, the development of 
the telecommunications and related services sector helps intensify the degree of 
international specialization by reducing transaction costs, which will encourage more 
domestic and foreign firms to be involved in international fragmentation of production.  
Along with the trend of globalization, China has become an important player in the 
international production chain through its increasing share of trade in parts and 
components with its main trading partners. China has now been incorporated into the 
regional production network consisting of Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and six 
ASEAN countries and is engaged in trading relationships with North American and 
European economies for parts and components. China has achieved tremendous 
dynamic gains from engaging in trade in parts and components especially with respect 
to its industrial upgrading through technological learning associated with processing 
trade (Amighini 2004). For the East Asian economies, the accession of China into such 
a regional production network has not only encouraged the further development of 
regional trade liberalization including service trade liberalization, it has also provided an 
enlarged market for all the regional economies. As a result, all parties involved will gain 
from participating in this dynamic process. Given the prospects of the rapid growth of 
the Chinese economy, its current and planned massive investments in research and 
development and in infrastructure including transportation and telecommunications, its 
continual policies in attracting FDI and its rapid move towards liberalizing its services 
sectors, the scope for China and its trading partners to benefit from the process of 
international fragmentation of production is tremendous.   12
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Table 1: China’s trade in parts and components, 1992–2004 
 SITC-7  SITC-8 
  Value  Share in  Share in  Value  Share in  Share in 
    P&C manufacturing    P&C manufacturing 
  (US$ billion)  (per cent)  (per cent)  (US$ billion)  (per cent)  (per cent) 
Exports           
1992   3.4  80  5.1  0.8  19.1  1.2 
1996   10  87  7.8  1.5  13.2  1.2 
2000   28  92  12.4  2.4  8.0  1.1 
2004   87  94  15.9  5.5  5.8  1.0 
           
Imports           
1992   10  87  15.8  1.6  13.1  2.4 
1996   20  92  17.7  1.7  8.1  1.1 
2000   51  96  29.1  2.1  4.0  1.2 
2004   148  97  33.4  4.1  2.7  1.0 
 
Note: SITC-7 denotes parts and components for machinery and transport equipment, and SITC-
8 represents miscellaneous manufacturing commodities. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD 2006). Trade and Development Report, United Nations, New York and Geneva. 
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Table 2:  Shares of component imports trade in China, by region, 1992–2005 (per cent) 
Region/country   1992 1993 1996 1997 2000 2001 2004 2005 
World  100 100 100    100 100 100 100 100 
NAFTAa    10.1 10.7 10.7 11.9 10.7 11.4  7.0  6.5 
United States  9.6  10.3  9.8  10.9 8.5 9.4 5.8 5.5 
Canada 0.6  0.4  0.9  0.9 1.6 1.2 0.5 0.4 
Mexico  -  -  - 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 
EU  (4)  13.9 13.7 10.2 10.8    10.9 11.2  7.6  6.1 
Germany 8.2  8.7  6.4  6.3 5.7 6.4 5.2 3.7 
France 2.4  1.6  1.4  1.8 2.7 2.3 1.2 1.2 
United Kingdom   1.3  1.7  1.3 1.7 1.7 1.5 0.6 0.6 
Italy 2.1  1.6  1.2  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 
Northeast Asia  61.5  54.5  58.8 57.6 52.7 51.1 52.9 53.4 
Hong Kong  38.7  16.2  9.5  7.6    5.4 5.1 2.6 2.1 
Japan  20.2 32.1 35.1 32.3 25.9 24.2 20.8 17.9 
Korea 1.8  3.9  7.5  8.4 9.3 8.4  12.6  15.3 
ASEAN  (5)  0.8  2.2  6.7  9.3 12.1 13.4 16.8 18.0 
Indonesia   -  -  0.1  0.2   0.4  0.5   0.5  0.4 
Malaysia   0.1  0.3  1.5  2.1 4.5 5.4 6.6 6.9 
Philippines    -  - 0.3 0.2 1.9 2.2 4.4 5.2 
Singapore 0.6  1.6  3.7  5.4   2.8  2.7   3.1  3.4 
Thailand 0.1  0.1  1.1  1.4    2.4 2.6 2.2 2.1 
Australia 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Other 14.2  20.9  19.3  19.4 25.3    25.8 32.1 33.7 
 
Note: 
a North American Free Trade Agreement. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD 2006). Trade and Development Report, United Nations, New York and Geneva. 
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Table 3:  Share of exports of parts and components from China, by region, 1992–2005 (per 
cent) 
Region/country  1992 1993 1996 1997 2000 2001 2004 2005 
World  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
NAFTA    7.2 17.2 16.0 16.0 16.1 16.6 17.2 17.2 
United  States  6.8 16.1 15.2 15.0 14.4 14.9 15.5 15.4 
Canada  0.3 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.7 
Mexico  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 
EU  (4)  2.2 9.1 5.8 6.2 7.4 6.6 7.1 7.1 
Germany  1.0 4.6 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.6 3.2 3.7 
France  0.3 1.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.9 
United  Kingdom 0.7 2.1 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 
Italy  0.2 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Northeast Asia  77.1  56.7  63.6 62.5 59.5 59.6 57.4 55.7 
Hong  Kong  62.3 30.1 26.7 26.4 26.6 27.0 28.0 28.4 
Japan  9.1 17.4 20.5 19.6 15.4 15.0 11.7 10.5 
Korea  1.2 2.4 5.5 4.9 4.8 4.6 5.3 4.9 
ASEAN  (5)  4.1  6.4 10.7 11.2 12.4 12.7 12.3 11.8 
Indonesia    0.6 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9 
Malaysia    0.8 1.2 2.3 2.2 2.0 3.4 3.3 3.2 
Philippines    0.3 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.4 1.2 
Singapore  1.9 2.6 5.1 4.9 5.7 5.1 4.8 4.8 
Thailand  0.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 2.0 2.1 1.4 1.4 
Australia  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Other  14.2 20.9 19.3 19.4 25.3 25.8 32.1 33.7 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD 2006). Trade and Development Report, United Nations, New York and Geneva.   17
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Unit labour costs across different countries, 1992–2004 (US$ of unit labour per hour) 
Country 1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
United States  16.0  16.4 16.8 17.2 17.8 18.2 18.6 18.9 19.7 20.6 21.4 22.3 22.9 
Canada 17.6  16.9 16.3 16.5 17.0 16.8 15.9 16.1 16.5 16.2 16.7 19.4 21.4 
Mexico ..  .. .. 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2  1.3 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Germany 25.2  23.9 25.3 30.1 29.6 26.0 25.2 24.6 22.7 22.5 24.2 29.6 32.5 
France 17.3  16.5 17.1 19.3 19.0 17.1 17.3 17.0 15.5 15.6 17.1 21.1 23.9 
United Kingdom  14.3  12.5 13.0 13.8 14.1 15.7 17.0 17.3 16.7 16.7 18.2 21.2 24.7 
Italy 18.9  15.4 15.4 15.7 17.1 16.1 15.8 15.5 13.8 13.6 14.7 18.1 20.5 
Australia 13.2  12.6 14.1 15.4 17.0 16.7 15.1 15.9 14.4 13.3 15.4 19.8 23.1 
Japan 16.2  18.9 21.0 23.6 20.5 19.1 17.7 20.5 22.0 19.4 18.6 20.3 21.9 
Korea  5.2 5.6 6.4 7.3 8.2 7.8 5.7 7.4 8.2 7.7 8.8 10.0 11.5 
Hong  Kong  3.9 4.3 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.5 
Singapore  4.9 5.2 6.2 7.6 8.2 8.0 7.4 7.0 7.2 7.0 6.7 7.2 7.4 
Philippines  0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Indonesia  0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Thailand  1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 
Malaysia  1.9 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.6 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Brazil n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.8 5.8 5.6  3.5 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.8 3.4 
India  0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
China  0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).   18
 
Table 5:  Estimation results of equation 1: imports  
   LNIMPORT  
Variable (1)  (2) 
C  –83.84*** –57.32*** –85.10*** –43.69*** 
  (–14.27) (–12.51) (–15.45)  (–5.72) 
LNAGDP  4.83*** 3.53*** 4.70*** 2.76*** 
  (16.42) (15.51) (16.31)  (6.59) 
LNDIST  –0.96*** –0.74*** –0.90*** –0.58*** 
  (–11.75) (–11.12) (–10.69)  (–5.84) 
LNFDI  0.19*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.28*** 
 (3.85)  6.60  (3.43)  (7.16) 
LNRWAGE  0.71*** 0.64*** 0.31**  0.32** 
 (5.39)  4.98  (2.36)  (2.17) 
LNTELELINE     0.99***  0.55* 
     (3.88)  (2.40) 
Fixed  effect  Yes No Yes No 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.74 
SE  1.14 1.13 1.10 1.12 
F-statistic 36.73  147.32  38.15  122.31 
Number of 
observations 
221 221 221 221 
 
Note: *** 1 per cent significant level, ** 5 per cent significant level, * 10 per cent significant level. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6:  Estimation results of equation 1: exports 
  LNEXPORT 
Variable (1)  (2) 
C –70.70***  –47.49***  –71.42***  –41.76*** 
 (–9.79)  (–15.42)  (–8.54)  (–7.45) 
LNAGDP 4.19***  3.05***  4.12***  2.73*** 
 (11.37)  (18.54)  (9.63)  (8.71) 
LNDIST –0.68***  –0.48***  –0.65***  –0.41*** 
 (–8.08)  (–9.65)  (–6.90)  (–5.29) 
LNFDI 0.24***  0.30***  0.22***  0.31*** 
 (4.32)  (7.19)  (3.72)  (6.66) 
LNRWAGE 0.13  0.05  –0.16*  –0.09 
 (1.63)  (0.89)  (–1.71)  (–0.78) 
LNTELELINE     0.56***  0.23* 
     (7.56)  (1.72) 
Fixed  effect  Yes No Yes No 
Adjusted R2 0.86  0.85  0.87  0.85 
SE 0.64  0.65  0.62  0.65 
F-statistic  81.32  311.78   83.35   253.01 
Number of observations  221  221  221  221 
 
Notes: *** 1 per cent significant level, ** 5 per cent significant level, * 10 per cent significant 
level. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   20
Table 7:  Estimation results of equation 2: export shares in total manufacturing exports 
  LNSEXPORT 
Variable (1)  (2) 
C  –19.37***  –19.00***  –19.46***  –17.14*** 
  (–5.97) (–10.30)  (–6.16) (–9.88) 
LNAGDP  1.09*** 1.07*** 1.09*** 0.97*** 
  (6.87) (11.93)  (7.06) (11.33) 
LNDIST  –0.34*** –0.33*** –0.34*** –0.31*** 
 (–12.25)  (–16.43)  (–12.94) (–16.76) 
LNFDI  –0.02 –0.01 –0.02 0.00 
  (–1.04) (–0.54) (–1.15) (–0.33) 
LNRWAGE  –0.12*** –0.14*** –0.15*** –0.18*** 
  (–4.46) (–5.11) (–6.24) (–5.85) 
LNTELELINE      0.07* 0.08** 
     (1.77) (2.54) 
Fixed  effect  Yes No  Yes No 
Adjusted R
2  0.70 0.67 0.70 0.67 
S.E.  0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 
F–statistic  29.44 110.79  27.69 88.81 
Number  of  observations  221 221 221 221 
 
Note: *** 1 per cent significant level, ** 5 per cent significant level,* 10 per cent significant level,  
T–statistic in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
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Figure 1:  China’s imports and exports of parts and component: 1992–2005 (billion US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated using the data from UN COMTRADE (2006). 
 
Figure 2:  Share of parts and components trade in manufacturing trade: 1992–2005 (%) 
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Source: Calculated using the data from UN COMTRADE (2006). 
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Figure 3:  Number of civil aviation airline routes in China, 1986–2005 
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Source: Data from China Economic Information Network. Available from http://www.cei.gov.cn.   
Figure 4:  Scale of seaport trade in China, 1985–2005 (10,000 tonnes) 
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Source: Data from  National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2006). China Statistical Yearbook, 
China Statistical Press, Beijing. 
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Figure 5:  Number of telephones per 1,000 people in China 
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Source: Data from World Bank (2006). World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
 
Figure 6:  China’s utilized FDI (US$100 million) 
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